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Summary findings
Hausch and Ramachandran further develop suclh  a  Hausch and Ramachandran determine equilibrium
market-based approach for situations in which claimants  bidding strategies, showing that the firm's aggregate
are severely cash-constrained and there is good  -eason  debts would be reduced to a more serviceable level. This
for existing owner-managers to remain in control.  would improve the incentives of the firm's owner-
Under the ACCORD scheme - Auction-based  managers, who remain in control, to operate  the firm
Creditor Ordering by Reducing Debts -creditors  efficiently. Economic resources would thus be better
remain creditors but form a queue, to be serviced in  used, and losses already incurred would be efficiently
sequence from the firm's operating cash flows.  and quickly allocated among creditors.
Creditors bid for their position in this queue. Those  Hausch and Ramachandran suggest that ACCORD
accepting greater proportionate reductions in the face  would be appropriate for East Asia, where, despite new
value of their claims (perhaps most pessimistic about the  bankruptcy laws, inexperienced courts are unlikely to
firm's prospects) are placed ahead of the others.  nudge creditors into a quick negotiated agreement nor to
A preexisting hierarchy of claims is honored by having  be able to cope with systemic bankruptcy. Moreover,
claimants bid for their positions within the relevant  when the government is a major unsatisfied creditor,
segment of the queue. No one in the queue, incliding  whose agents may not act in the taxpayers' best interests,
owners (who are last), is paid anything until the  market-based solutions might remove political
(reduced) debts of the first in line are fully discharged.  interference from restructuring decisions. Neither
The queue then moves up and the next claimant in line is  owners nor creditors would be worse off than they are
serviced.  now.
Deferred creditors, who must wait their turn  for the
firm's operating cash surpluses, are not junior creditors
in the conventional sense.
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I.  Introduction
The basic approach in bankruptcy has creditors negotiate with debtors and with each other to
reorganize the liabilities if the firm is viable, or to liquidate the firm in an orderly manner if it is not.
Courts supervise the process to prevent individual creditors from "grabbing" assets or garnering proceeds
out of turn and to prevent holdouts from getting an unfair advantage.  Countries differ in their bankruptcy
procedures but all have their critics?2
The 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code, for instance, allows firms to be either liquidated under Chapter
7 or reorganized under Chapter 11. Two common criticisms of Chapter 7 are that (1) viable firms may be
needlessly dismantled, and (2)-  sales proceeds would be meagre when the most likely buyers of industry-
specific assets are buffeted by the same adverse economic developments as the bankrupt firm (Shleifer
and Vishny 1992). Chapter 11 is a structured negotiation between current managers (representing
owners, but subject to the principal-agent problem) and the creditors, with the outcome being a different
payment stream than what was originally contracted.  To limit holdouts stemming from the free-rider
problem, courts allow the original debt contracts to be breached if there is substantial, albeit less than
unanimous, creditor approval of the revised terms.  Chapter 11 is often criticized as (1) too lengthy with
high legal and administrative costs, (2) having a pro-management bias, and (3) violating the absolute
priority of claims (because secured creditors cannot immediately seize assets and payouts to junior
claimants are common despite reductions in the claims of senior claimants).
IUniversity  of Wisconsin,  Madison  and  the World  Bank,  respectively.  Readers  of an earlier  paper should  note that
the ACCORD  scheme  described  here is simpler  than the earlier  TADA  and  uses the private  information  that
creditors  reveal  about firm  values  in their  bids.
2  Berkovitch  and Israel  (1999)  show  that a country's  optimal  bankruptcy  procedure  is a function  of the ability  of
creditors  to gain inforrnation  about the firm and  the ability  of managers  to exploit  their private  information.
1Bebchuk (1988) proposed a market-based alternative to a negotiated bankruptcy.  Using Black
and Scholes' original insight that equity is a call option on the firm's assets with an exercise price equal to  -
the debt that is owed, Bebchuck proposes working up the hierarchy of claims.  Starting with the most
junior claimant (namely, equity), each claimant class is given a choice of either paying off all the more
senior claimants in full or having its own claims extinguished.  Whichever class pays off all the more
senior claimants become the firm's new owners.  Bebchuk's proposal respects the absolute priority of
claims and results in an all-equity firnm
Bebchuk's proposal allows only existing claimants (shareholders and creditors) to bid.  Outsiders
may run the firm better thereby raising its value; so Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992, hereafter AHM)
proposed allowing outsiders to also bid and to specify different ways the existing claims would be paid:
creditors may propose restructuring the existing debt, while an outside bidder (e.g. a firm in a similar
business) may offer to merge and replace debt with equity in the merged entity.  Different classes of
claimants would value the bids differently (e.g. senior claimants would tend to prefer offers with a low
variance to the retums), and AHM propose "homogenizing" the claimants (possibly through Bebchuk's
scheme), so that the various offers could be voted on.
While AHM's proposal is more suitable when outsiders could run the firm better, it may require
bidders to pay in cash and it may involve cash payments to achieve homogenized bidders prior to the
vote. 4 Thus, this procedure may be adversely affected by systemic bankruptcy, since potential bidders are
often cash constrained and capital markets are typically functioning imperfectly, and because the scale of
the financial distress simple precludes replacing many of the managers.
East Asia's Systemic Problems
Firms in the crisis countries of East Asia are heavily indebted.  They were highly leveraged
before the crisis, and leverage has increased since.  Debts were often denominated in foreign currency
3 The firm could  borrow  through  a separate  transaction  that  could occur simultaneously  if all the claimants  in that
class agree  to acceptpro rata fractions  of each  class of liabilities  in the desired  new financial  structure.
4  Although,  Hart,  La Porta Drago,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Moore (1997)  offer a variation  on AHM  that
accommodates  cash-constrained  claimants.
2even for non-exporters.  The economic crisis was accompanied by sharp rises in interest rates and falls in
their currencies' value in the foreign exchange market; but even if interest rates and exchange rates were




Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand
1998 to 1996 Real  0.88  1.00  1.00  1.05  0.92
GDP ratio
1998 GDP  $105 b  $309  b.  $69.4  b.  $68  b.  $121  b.
Nominal  Exchange  2.75  1.31  1.5  1.43  1.44
Rate ratio: mid-1999
to mid 1997
Capacity  utilisation'  58%  71%  65%  68%  60%
(mid-1998)___
Total  Corporate  Debt  118.0  444.0  120.2  47.5  195.7
(b. US$ equivalent)
Of which extemal  67.1  64  40  23.3  32.5
...  domestic  debt  50.9  380.0  80.2  24.2  163.2
(b. US$ equiv).
Banking  Sector's  50.3  72.4  23.0  17.8  46.8
External Debt
(b US$)
Debt  to Equityratio  2.0  3.5  1.1  1.4  2.4
1996
'World Bank  survey  of firms  (mid-1998)
The firms have been generally well run. While total factor productivity appears to have been
declining in recent years, making East Asia's  growth less miraculous than was earlier believed, few doubt
that firms' managers (who are very closely linked to the controlling owners) are generally competent and
able to adapt to the new situation: there are vigorous attempts to restore the firms' profitability.  Even so,
debts that cannot be serviced must be renegotiated, and this is not occurring rapidly.  The status quo
erodes the owner-managers' incentives to operate the firm efficiently because any increase in firm value
accrues entirely to the creditors.  Put differently, the owners' call options are now far "out of the money"
because the exercise price far exceeds the asset value of the firm.
Countries have promulgated new bankruptcy laws or amended old ones and are improving their
courts'  functioning.  It is nevertheless clear that the courts are - and should be - designed to deal with
3the normal mortality rate of firms, not those stemming from an economy-wide scale ("systemic crisis").
Furthennore, it would be foolhardy for most creditors to take over and try to operate the affected firms:
they lack the skill and cannot oversee the managers that do.  Managers have valuable finrm-specific  human
capital and are beholden (and often related) to the owners.
What is needed therefore is a quick way for the debts to be reduced to sustainable levels without
disrupting existing management which is restructuring operations in response to the changed markets.
Bankruptcy negotiations would stall if owner-managers fear a loss of control, and courts are too
inexperienced to nudge discussions along.  Furthermore, governments have intervened heavily in the
banking system and their agencies are now major creditors to the privately owned firms.  There is a
considerable risk that debt negotiations could take on a political color.  Market based alternatives to court
proceedings are therefore very attractive.
The Need for a Different Scheme
The existing proposals in the literature, ingenious though they are, may be unsuited to the East
Asian circumstances. Credit markets work poorly especially now: domestic banks are largely bankrupt
(governments are restructuring them) and access to foreign credit has been disrupted.  With potential
domestic bidders cash constrained, large-scale sales to foreigners could generate a backlash of public
sentiment, especially in countries with recent and unpleasant colonial experiences.  Even if these
problems were surmountable, outsiders (whiether  domestic or foreign) face an acute information
asymmetry problem: firms have been remarkably coy about divulging their finances to their own
creditors, let alone to unrelated parties even if they were potential bidders.  Schemes relying on outside
bidders (as in the AHM proposal) or having junior claimants raise additional cash (as in the Bebchuck
proposal) are therefore unworkable.
The Proposed ACCORD
This paper develops a non-cash auction based scheme called the ACCORD (for Auction based
Creditor Ordering by Reducing Debts).  Creditors bid the reduction in the claims they are willing to
accept, and their bids arrange them in a queue to be serviced in sequence. Those willing to accept the
4greatest  proportionate reduction are placed ahead of the others in the queue.  Creditors are then serviced
sequentially from the operating cash surplus of the firm which owners continue to control and operate.
Note that all creditors remain creditors; but those that forgive proportionately more have their
(reduced) debtsfully  discharged before those who forgave less.  Creditors who believe the firm to be
worth little would be willing to forgive a larger proportion of their claim to be sure of obtaining at least
something before the funds run out.  Conversely, creditors who think that the firm's difficulties are only
temporary would forgive little, and wait patiently (further behind in line) for their turn to receive
payments.  The original equity-holders (i.e. the most junior claimants) do not bid and continue to own and
operate the firm, obtaining any residual that may be left.  The details of the administrative arrangements
-who  conducts the auction, safeguards against breaches in rules etc. - are outlined in section IV.
The ACCORD may be thought of as auctioning places in a creditor queue that is being formed
within an existing hierarchy of claims.  Creditors essentially bid by the fraction of debt they forgive and
face a trade-off: the more they forgive, the sooner (and so more likely) they will be repaid.  The bidder
incentives and the resulting equilibrium are explored in the paper, and some variants of this basic scheme
are outlined.
The Structure of the Paper
After this introduction, a non-technical reader could quickly proceed to section IVfor  a
discussion of the implementation of the scheme.  Section II describes the basic version of the ACCORD
when equally senior creditors share a common belief about the probability distribution surrounding the
value of the firm.  The equilibrium bidding strategies are derived, and the resulting equilibrium is shown
to reduce debts to a more serviceable level.  The equilibrium outcome of ACCORD gives the owners a
positive expected residual return which, unlike the status quo, restores their incentive to operate the firm
efficiently (i.e. their call options on the firm would not be way out of the money).
Section HII  discusses extensions to allow for an initial seniority structure of the debt and for
creditors with heterogeneous beliefs about the value of the firm.  It also considers possible collusion
5among  the creditors  and how to treat the government  when  it is a creditor. The ACCORD  scheme  is
shown  to be quite robust  to collusion  or mistaken  bids.
Section  IV outlines some implemnentation  issues  to illustrate  how  the ACCORD  could  be
introduced. As the scheme  requires  no discretionary  rulings,  and infornation that allows for collusion  or
fraud is not available  to a single  person  who may be vulnerable  to threats  or favors,  any shortcomings  of
the courts would  not impede  ACCORD's  working. This is why auctions  have great  merit. Countries  like
Thailand  have  demonstrated  their ability  to conduct  auctions  (the Financial  Restructuring  Agency  sold the
loan  portfolios  of the finance  companies  that were closed in 1997).
II.  The ACCORD  Scheme:  "Auctions  Speak  Louder  than Words"
Under  the proposed  ACCORD  scheme,  creditors  arrange  themselves  in a queue  to be serviced  in
sequence,  but remain  creditors  (i.e.  they do not become  residual  claimants,  or owners). Unlike  the
servicing  of debts  with the usual seniority  structure  (who  all receive  periodic  interest  payments),  under
ACCORD,  only the creditor  who is at the head of the queue  gets  paid. Only when the (reduced)  debts of
the first in line are fully discharged,  and the queue  moves up does  the next person  receive any payment.
Creditors  therefore  wait in line to step up to the head  and only then  be paid.
Each creditor  bids  the reduction  in the face value  of the debt  that they are willing  to accept,  and
their claim is reduced  by this proportion. The  reduced  claims are  arranged  in order of the proportion
reduced,  with the resulting  queue  headed  by the creditor  with the greatest  proportionate  reduction. 5 Thus,
creditors  essentially  choose between  accepting  a smaller  fraction  of their (original)  debt but receiving  the
payments  sooner  (i.e. with a higher  probability)  or waiting longer  for more. A creditor  who offers  no
reduction  (or does  not bid at all) is placed  at the back  of the queue,  but ahead  of the owners  who as
equity-holders,  continue  to control  and operate  the firm and obtain  any residual  after all the debts are
discharged.
5 If there  are  different  classes  of  creditors  initially,  the  ordering  of  the  classes  is  unchanged  and  the  bids  within  each
class  are  arranged  according  to the  reductions  bid.
6Two Illustrative Examples
Consider a firm whose assets have an expected market value of $100 and two creditors are each
owed more than $50, so that the firm is in financial distress.  In this section, we consider the case when
both creditors are equally senior and hold a common belief about the firm's value.  In the next section, we
extend the discussion to initial debt structure with different creditor seniority and to heterogeneous beliefs
about the value of the firm.
We now consider two examples to illustrate bidding strategies under ACCORD.  In both
examples, the creditor who forgives more of the debt becomes the senior claimant and the original equity-
holders remain residual claimants.
Example  1:  No Uncertainty
With no uncertainty, the firm's assets are surely worth $100, and each creditor is trying to get as
much of this as he can.  Let the bid bi represent the new face value of the debt that creditor i=1,2 offers in
the auction, so that a lower bid means more forgiveness. The unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is b,
= b2 = 50 (i.e., both offer a new face value of 50, which is 50 percent forgiveness). As a result, the junior
claimant is determined by some tie-breaking rule and, whether junior or senior, a creditor receives a
certain payoff of 50.
While it is easily seen that b, = b2  =  50 is a Nash equilibrium, it is less clear why this equilibrium
is unique.  To show that there are no other pure-strategy equilibria, consider an equilibrium candidate in
which, say, creditor I bids b,  ￿  50.  First suppose that bi > 50.  Then creditor 2 optimally responds with
b2 = b, - c, in which case b, is not a best strategy for bidder 1. Second suppose that b, < 50.  Then
creditor 2 optimally responds with b2  =  100 -bk, in which case bl is not best for bidder 1.6
Example 2:  With Uncertainty
6  Note  how the continuum  of equilibria  to the Divide-the-Dollar  Game  is reduced  to a unique  equilibrium  with  the
introduction  of our  seniority  structure.
7We first show that Example I 's equilibrium no longer holds with the introduction of uncertainty,
and then derive the mixed strategy equilibrium bid.
Suppose that the value of the firm could be low (L) or high (H) with H > L > 0. Note that since
each event is equally likely and the firm's expected value is 100, H = 200 - L.  To see that the earlier
bidding strategy would not be equilibrium, consider two cases when creditor I chooses b1 = 50.
First, suppose L > 50.  Bidding b2 = 50 will result in a tie, and creditor 2 will be randomly
selected to be either senior or junior creditor.  If senior, creditor 2 receives 50 with certainty.  If junior,
creditor 2 receives an expected return of '-!(L - 50) + I/2(50)  = '/2L < 50.  Thus, creditor 2's  average return
from also forgiving 50 percent is strictly less than 50.  Creditor 2 prefers bidding b2  =  100 (i.e., no
forgiveness), for an expected return as junior claimant of '/2(L-50) + '/2(H-50) = 50.
The second case has L < 50.  Creditor 2's expected return from bidding b2 = 50 is l/2(L) + '/2(50)
< 50 if chosen to be senior creditor and '/2(0)  + l/2(50)  = 25 if junior.  Thus, creditor 2 expects a return
strictly less than 50.  Creditor 2 prefers to bid b2 = 100, which guarantees junior status and an expected
return of l/2(0) + I/2(100) =  50.
A pure strategy equilibrium does not exist for this example.  If creditor I forgives a lot, then
creditor 2 prefers to forgive nothing; but if creditor 1 forgives little, then creditor 2 will forgive slightly
more to become the senior creditor.  We now determine the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Let a bid b represent the new (reduced) face value of the debt that is offered by the creditor (i.e.,
level of forgiveness = original face value - b).  Define:
GI(b;cl)  = 2 +  c1
G2(b;C2)=C2  + bS
2bL
G3(b;cl,CD =2+  c2 --  1 cl  sin  i  500-3L-4b1
12b-100  4i2b  -100  L 300-3L
400 +2L -b  C 3
G4 (b;  c2,  C3) = 403L  b + C2 +J2  - 0  +2 3L  2b ~-200±  2L
8and  G5(b;c,,C4)=  3+  C4  _i  slin  _F600-5L-4b
2  /2b -200  +2L  2 v'2b - 200 + 2L  200-L
Also, define L* as the solution to:
2  2L-100  . -1[500 -7L  =22  +sin'(1/3).
400-5L  300-3L  (
(I.e., L*;z76.95)
The symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is for each creditor to independently draw b from an
interval [ b, b ] according to a cumulative probability distribution, G(b).  Since the other creditor will not
bid less than  b, there is no benefit to bidding more than H-b . In fact, we show that b = H-b . Thus, b <
/2H < b.  There are four cases of L to consider in specifying the equilibrium: i)  b <  H/21  < b < L; ii)  b <
1/2H  < L < b; iii) L < b < L </ 2H < b; and iv) L <  b < 1/ 2H < b.  The symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium is as follows:
Case 1:  L* <L<  100
{  G1(b;cj)  forbO [b,1/2H]
G(b)
G3(b;c 1,c2)  for b 0 [Y 2H,  b],
where {cl,c2,  ,b } solves GI(b;cl)=0,  G(Y/2H;cj)G 3(Q/ 2H;c 1,c2), G3(b ;c1,c2)=I, and b + b =H.
Case 2:  200/3 < L < L*
G1(b;cl)  for b 0 [b ,1/2H]
G(b) =  G3(b;c 1,C 2)  for b 0 [V2H,L]
G5(b;ci,c 3)  for b 0 [L,  b
where {c1,c2,c3, b, b  } solves G(  b;cl)=O,  G1(V/ 2H;cl)=G 3(/ 2H;cl,c2), G3(L;c1,c2)=G5(L;c 1,c3),
G5(b;c1,c3)=1, and b+b=H.
Case 3:  100/(1+2"/3)  < L < 200/3
9GI(b;cl)  for b 0 [ b,L]
G(b) =  G2(b;c 1,c2)  for b 0 [L,V 2H]
G4(b;c 2,c3)  for  b 0 [/ 2H,H-L]
G5(b;c,c 4)  for  b 0 [H-L, b],
where XcI,c 2,c3,c4, b,  b } solves GI(b;cl)=0,  G1(L;cl)=G3(L;c 1,c2), G3(1/2H;c 1 ,c2)=G 4(/ 2H;c2,c3), G4(H-
L;c2,c3)=G5(H-L;ci,c4),  G5(b;c],c 4)=1, and b+ b  =H.
Case 4:  0<L￿  L0  100/(1+2"3) {  G2(b;c 2)  for b 0 [b,1/ 2H]
G(b)= 
G4(b;c 2,c4)  for b 0 [V 2H,b ],
where {c 2,c4, b, b }  solves G2( b ;c2)=0, G2(1/2H;c 2)=G 4(1/2H;c 2,c2), G4( b ;c2,c4)=l, and  b + b =H.
The proof is in Appendix I; but we now consider several interesting features of the equilibrium.
First, in all four cases, the creditors are indifferent among the bids on [b, b] . Bidding b guarantees the
creditor both senior status and, for cases 1-  3, guarantees a payment of b, since it can be shown that L > b
for these three cases.  In case 4, L < b, so expected payment is '/2L  + 1/2  b.  Figure I illustrates the range
of bids, [ b, b],  as L varies from 0 to 100. Second, the maximum value of b is 111.5. Thus, our analysis
implicitly assumes that the original face value of the debt owed to each creditor exceeds $111.50 (because
creditors cannot be permitted to bid a negative level of forgiveness). If each creditor is owed less than
$115.50, however, the analysis needs to be slightly modified, but the results are qualitatively the same.
Third, for L close to zero (which means H is near 200), bids are in a small range around 100, which is
roughly the value of each creditor's claim were it known that the outcome would be H with certainty.
Thus, in effect, the creditors essentially ignore the L outcome, because its value is so low, and focus on
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Figure 1: For Example 2, the range of bids, [b,  b ], as L varies from 0 to 100.
(Recall that H = 200 - L, so H varies from 200 to 100.)
Since the expected value of the firm is Y/2(L+H),  absolute priority requires that each creditor
receive 1/4(L+H).  It can be shown that, for all cases 1-4, each creditor's expected return is less than
1/4(L+H),  though.  As explained above, the reason for this is that if a creditor bids so as to realize the full
residual return in the event that they become the junior claimant, this emboldens the other creditor to
forgive less also, which leaves less for the first creditor.
In equilibrium, since the creditors realize less than the expected value of the firm, the owner-
manager's equity position has a positive expected value.  This is an important outcome because it
provides the owners with an incentive to operate the firm efficiently.  Figure 2 illustrates that expected
value as L varies from 0 to 100 (and H varies from 200 to 100). Notice that as L increases from 0, the
owner-manager's expected return increases.  Beyond about L=55, though, this expected return decreases.
To understand this reversal, consider the extreme case of L=0 and H=200, for which the variance of the
11value is highest. In this case, the creditors each bid b=l 00 (i.e., no forgiveness), for an expected return of
100  with probability 1/2,  which leaves zero expected return for the owner-manager.  Bidding b=100 is
precisely what the creditors would have bid if the value of the firm was known to be 200 with certainty.
As discussed above, the creditors' bidding ignores the event that the firm value is zero, since there will be
no value to realize in that event.  By comparison, consider an example where the value is, say, uniform on
[L,H]. Then as L approaches zero, the variance of the value increases, but we speculate that bidding does
not focus exclusively on the possible high values.  Thus, we speculate that our example's result that the
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Figure 2:  For Example 2, the expected return to the owner-managers following the
ACCORD scheme, as L ranges from 0 to 100. Since the expected value of the firm is
100 for all values of L, the expected return to creditors = 100 - expected return to
owner-managers.
Despite the owner-manager's expected residual return, the equilibrium forgiveness is not
sufficient to guarantee that the new debt level will be sustainable.  This is immediate since, as noted
above,  b > H/2, so it is possible for the new level of debt to exceed even H.  Also, Figure 1 shows that b
12> '2L.  Thus, equilibrium forgiveness is guaranteed to be insufficient in the event that the realization of
the firm value is L.  (On the other hand, b <  V/2H,  so the new level of debt may be sustainable.) In
practice, bankruptcy reorganization cannot guarantee that a firm will not subsequently experience
financial distress (just as a firm that has not experienced financial distress in the past cannot guarantee
that financial distress will not occur in the future).  We discuss this issue at greater length in Section III.
III.  Additional Considerations in ACCORD
The earlier section showed that the ACCORD scheme results in debt forgiveness and that the
owner-manager could expect a positive residual return, which provides the vital incentive to operate the
firm efficiently.  This result arises from the uncertainty over the value of the firm.  We now extend these
results in several ways.
A)  Pre-Existing Seniority of Claims
Example 2 is now altered to include junior creditors who have claims in addition to the two
(senior) creditors. Since the payoffs to the two senior creditors do not depend on the junior creditors'
claims, the optimal bidding strategy of senior creditors (described in Section II) would be unchanged.  We
now examine the junior creditor's bidding strategy.
Let S represent the sum of the senior creditors' bids.  As was noted, L < 2 b  < S and H may
exceed S.  Consequently, the junior creditors face a residual value of 0 or max{H-S,O}, depending on
whether the realized firm value is L or H, respectively.  Based on the equilibrium bidding from Section II,
junior creditors will bid b = Y2max{H-S,0},  which eliminates all positive expected residual returns for  the
owners.
It is Example 2's two-point distribution assumption that entirely eliminates the owners' expected
residual returns.  If the distribution of firm values were continuous, there will be a narrower (but not
degenerate) distribution of returns available to the junior creditors, which would lead them to bid some
forgiveness, which in turn would offer a positive expected residual return to the owners.
13For a more complex initial seniority structure and a continuous distribution of firm value, all
senior creditor classes who are certain that they would be repaid, would bid no forgiveness. Only in the
class where there is some probability -no  matter how small - of not being fully paid, would bids
involve forgiveness as in Section II. Creditors in yet lower levels will also bid some forgiveness (when
firms' values have a continuous distribution), thereby always leaving owners with some residual expected
returns.
This pattern of progressively smaller but positive expected returns to the progressively more
junior creditors violates absolute priority (except that it is voluntary); but it helps the functioning of
ACCORD.  In any class, creditors need both uncertainty and some expected return as an incentive to
compete for a better position in their segment of the queue; otherwise, they have no incentive to forgive,
which would adversely affect the outcome of ACCORD.  Alternatively, if someone (government?) could
extinguish the claims of the very junior creditors, owners would be assured of an even greater positive
expected return.
B)  Creditors with Private Information
Section II assumed that the creditors share a common belief about the probability distribution of
the value of the firm.  In practice, creditors may have different information and may interpret the same
information about the firm differently.  Introducing private information in Appendix II, a variation of the
ACCORD scheme has an equilibrium in which creditors with more optimistic views of the firm's
prospects forgive more than those who are more pessimistic.  Thus, the most senior (junior) creditors will
be those who are most pessimistic (optimistic).  This outcome is efficient since there are no mutually
beneficial trades of positions.  If, on the other hand, those most pessimistic became the junior creditors,
there are gains from junior and senior creditors switching positions.
C)  What if Forgiveness were Insufficient?
As noted with Example 2, ACCORD may not generate sufficient forgiveness to guarantee that
subsequent financial distress will never occur.  This is a common occurrence with the bankruptcy
procedures that are used in practice, too.  Gilson (1995) reports that one quarter to one third of financially
14distressed firms that reorganize re-experience financial distressed within a few years.  The expectation of
another opportunity to reorganize could alter bidding strategies: creditors would bid a smaller forgiveness,  -
thereby increasing the likelihood of subsequent bankruptcy.  On the other hand, creditors realize that such
uncertainty is detrimental to the firm, and may bid with this knowledge.
Our model could be extended to incorporate in the creditors' bids the likely increase in the value
of the firm (viz., a rightward shift in the probability distribution) because of the restoration of owner-
manager incentives; but this is not attempted here.
D)  Bidder Collusion
Collusion is a concern in any auction.  If creditors in Example 2 could perfectly collude, the bids
would be b1 = b2 =  '/2H, giving them the entire value of the firm (regardless of whether L or H was
realized) and leaving the owner-managers with nothing.  This is not an equilibrium, of course, since each
creditor has an incentive to bid slightly more forgiveness to become senior creditor (i.e. realize
min{L,'/2H}  if state L occurs, rather than '/2L  from collusion.).  Hence the importance of the detailed
bidding procedures that inhibit collusion, as discussed in section IV on implementation.
Several aspects of our setting suggest that collusion may not be a serious problem.  First, perfect
collusion can extract only the positive expected residual return available to the owner-managers. Second,
it can be counterproductive to extract too much of the residual value from the owner-managers; so the
larger creditors are unlikely to collude.  Third, the distrust among creditors may be sufficient to preclude
collusion, especially when the set of creditors differ for each firm participating in the ACCORD auctions.
E)  Government-creditor and Noncompetitive Bids
Many East Asian governments now hold (directly or indirectly) substantial claims against
financially distressed private firms.  The governments have taken over, or substantially control the
domestic banks whose non-performing loans far exceed their capital.  Banks' claims on private,
financially distressed firms (whether residing in the intervened banks, or in bank restructuring agencies,
or asset management companies) are substantial and are not controlled by the government. While the
government agent could bid like other creditors, given its size and vulnerability to making politically
15motivated bids, we suggest that these claims be reduced by the weighted average of the other bids.  Such
"non-competitive bids" (to use the misleading term from the auction for U.S. Treasury Bills) would avoid
politicizing the auction, and may also be permitted for other small creditors who may be at an
informational disadvantage.
F)  Non-Participating  Creditors
If a creditor does not bid, one response would be to treat this as a refusal to forgive and place him
at the end of the relevant segment of the queue.  Knowing this, other creditors would be emboldened to
forgive less because they are certain to be ahead of the inactive creditor.  The result, depending on how
many non-bidders there may be, could be insufficient reduction in the aggregate debts of the firm.
An alternative would be to treat non-bidders like the non-competitive bidders, and reduce their
claims by the weighted average forgiveness.  While this may be reasonable, it may increase the incentive
to corrupt the auction process by providing an incentive for bids "to go missing."
IV.  Implementation and Conclusions
A common reaction to unusual solutlions  is "Has it been done before?" and the absence of a direct
precedent offers little comfort that it would work as promised.  Unprecedented problems (systemic
bankruptcy on this scale) cannot have tested solutions; but while the ACCORD is still a proposal,
auctions of analogous importance and complexity are increasingly widespread.  The Federal
Communications Commission in the United States allocated the rights to spectrum use inefficiently for
decades to radio and television stations, and subject to political interference; but it auctioned a part of the
spectrum suitable for cellular telephone use in 1996. There is now an extensive literature that both
describes the important role that theoretical work on simple auction models played in the design of these
extremely complex auctions and examines their success (e.g., Cramton 1995, 1997).
7  It could also  be that  the government's  claims  and queue  positions  are assigned  to match  perfectty  the
proportionate  reductions  and queue positions  of the other  creditors. Thus,  rather  than the government's  claims
appearing  as a bulge in  the middle  of the queue,  its claims  could be uniformly  spread  over  the queue.
16An important advantage of the ACCORD is to prevent the politics from distorting the
renegotiations of debts.  East Asian governments and courts already have a reputation for being
susceptible to the influence of powerful and wealthy business interests.  With the taxpayers bearing much
of the losses (through the government guarantee of banking deposits), some of the well-connected debtors
may enjoy an unwarranted reduction in debts in negotiations with government agents (e.g. the asset
management companies or bank restructuring agencies which hold the claims). Even if this did not occur,
the fear of such an accusation would stymie any bureaucrat negotiating unpaid claims.  An auction
protects the honest civil servant because the government-controlled claims could be reduced by the
weighted average of other bids.
The ACCORD does not require a complex bureaucracy, and the auction could be conducted
either by the bankruptcy courts or outside of them.  While the details should be tailored to the
circumstances of each country, it may be useful to outline the procedure.
An Example
The example describes the process conducted under the aegis of the bankruptcy court, although
the judge need not be familiar with either auction theory or bankruptcy negotiations.  The rules of
participating in the ACCORD scheme and the auction procedures (bidding forms, deadlines etc.) are
announced.  The court appoints (1) an ACCORDer and (2) a Recorder whose roles are far more modest
than that of a conventional administrator or receiver under bankruptcy.  Each could therefore handle
several scores of firms.  Splitting the oversight role between the two greatly reduces the likelihood that
the scheme could be subverted through corruption.  Only one of them, perhaps the ACCORDer, needs to
be an official of the court; the recorder could be an accounting firm with an incentive to maintain an
international reputation for honesty and trustworthiness.
There is no coercion involved: only if the firm and a significant minority of creditors agree,
should it be included in the ACCORD scheme.  A refusal would have no adverse repercussions -
beyond the existing "threat" of conventional bankruptcy filing.  Also, undertaking the preparatory steps is
17non-binding; it is only just before the auction is conducted that the parties commit themselves irrevocably
to the ACCORD rules.
Preparatory Steps
Any of the parties involved -a  creditor (e.g. a bank restructuring agency that has inherited the
claim), an owner, or the firm's managers  - could approach the bankruptcy judge to suggest the firm for
the ACCORD scheme.  This does not constitute a filing for bankruptcy, and the court's  role at this stage
is simply that of a clearinghouse for information.
The court writes to the firm's managers explaining the ACCORD scheme and its rules and asking
them if they are interested to submit (1) a list of creditors and the amounts they are owed, and (2) a
business plan within 30 days.  The letter is only copied to the party who suggested the firm (so he knows
his request is heeded) but there is no publicity as with a bankruptcy filing.  The firm's owner-managers
would likely prefer the ACCORD scheme to conventional financial reorganisation under bankruptcy
where their ownership may be diluted and they may lose control.  So they may agree and provide the
court with the creditor list and the business plan.  They may even contact the major creditors directly to
canvass support for the plan and ensure that the requisite majority approves it so the auction could
proceed.
If the firm declines, or fails to respond by the deadline specified, the matter ends; but if the firm
submits a plan, the court merely conveys it to all the creditors involved without examining its viability or
fairness.  As in a conventional financial reorganisation, the creditors may form a committee to meet the
firm's managers and discuss the plan; but the court would not be involved in this.  As creditors may not
approve a skimpy plan, the firn's  owners have an incentive to supply information to the creditors'
satisfaction.  To alert any claimants whom the firm did not list, the court announces (i.e. publishes in the
official gazette) that it would conduct an auction for the firm under ACCORD rules (detailed below) in 2
weeks time if (a) there are no disputes about the creditor list and amounts owed and (b) the requisite
18super-majority 8 of creditors approve the plan.  After the requisite 2 weeks, the judge ascertains (a) and (b)
in a hearing.  If she is not satisfied (perhaps new claimants emerge etc.), the matter ends there with no
prejudice against any party.  In other words, they are free to either live with the status quo or file any suit
under the bankruptcy or other laws, or to attempt entering the ACCORD again later.  If the judge is
satisfied, then the parties enter the ACCORD scheme.
The Binding ACCORD rules
It is at this stage, and before the auction is conducted, that the judge binds the parties to the
ACCORD rules.  All creditors 9 forfeit their right to file bankruptcy or liquidation petitions for (say) 5
years.  Owners agree to forgo any cash dividends or payouts during this period and, if the reduced debts
are not fully discharged by the end of the 5 years, to automatic liquidation  10 The automatic liquidation
clause protects creditors against the firm accumulating cash surpluses (which may have genuine business
reasons) instead of servicing the debts of those in the creditor queue.  Box I explains how the auction
could be conducted, the outcome announced, and other details which make it harder for participants to
collude.
8 The requisite  supermajority  would  be the same  as that  required  for a cram down  under the bankruptcy  law:
generally  a simple  majority  within  each class and  two-thirds  or three-quarters  of the aggregate.  This  would  also
bind any new creditors  who subsequently  lend  the firm  money  (suitable  clauses  could be inserted  into the loan
contract).
9 Since the requisite  super-majority  needed for any cram  down  under conventional  bankruptcy  have approved  both
the plan and the decision  to enter the ACCORD  scheme,  this can be made  binding  on the dissenters.
10  Depending  on the company  law, a shareholder  meeting  may  have  to approve  the management  decision. The
meeting  may also  be required  to approve  a curtailed  role for the Board  of Directors  and  managers  to protect  them
against  shareholder  suits  (although  few countries  are as litigious  as the United States).
19Box 1: Some Procedural details
Bidding:  Creditors submit sealed bids to the recorder who opens only the outer envelope.  Inside is (1) a slip with the bidder's name
(address etc.) and (2) another sealed envelope containing the bid which he does not open.  The claim's priority and face value is on
the outside of this inner envelope.  Creditors may submit multiple envelopes bidding different reductions for different face values
(which also helps hide his identity because the list of original claims is publicly known).
The Recorder notes the bidder's name and face value of the claim in his records and allots a unique identifying code which
is stamped on the slip and on the outside of the inner envelope (which does not otherwise identify the creditor). The Recorder checks
the face value off against the publicly available list of original claims so no one submits bids in excess of what they have.  The bidder
gets the slip back as proof of the bid (it has his name and identifying code).
When the date for accepting bids ends, the Recorder also submits envelopes on behalf of creditors who did not bid (an
identifying code and amount outside with a zero reduction bid inside).  So there are sealed envelopes totaling the aggregate claims
outstanding (publicly known), and all these unopened inner envelopes are passed on to the ACCORDer.
The Auction: The ACCORDer opens the inner envelopes on the appointed day in public and collates the auction results.  The
aggregate reduction in debt is announced immediately. Each creditor can verifv that his bid is untampered, his position in the queue
and (if he keeps track of all bids) the (reduced) amount owed ahead of (and behind) him; but because of the identifying codes, he
does not know the position of others in the queue or how much each forgave (making bid collusion difficult). The ACCORDer
knows the codes of those in line, but not their true identity.  The Recorder (who is not present at the opening) knows the codes and
the creditor identity, but not the auction result of any creditor (aggregate data are public).  The firm (i.e. owner) knows the original
claims of each creditor and the aggregate reduction in debt, but knows neither the order nor the individual amounts of the deferred
claims.
The ACCORDer sends a written confirmation of each bidder's result (in a sealed envelope with the identifying code
outside) through the Recorder (who forwards it to the creditor).
Periodic Payments: The firm makes periodic payments to an escrow account which the Recorder administers.  The ACCORDer,
told the cash balance, in tum tells the Recorder whom to pay (identifying code) and how much.  The recorder sends each creditor a
quarterly statement of how much is outstanding ahead of him, so they know how the queue is moving.
Secondary Market: The deferred claims are transferable; but as they are not uniform, trading will only be sporadic with negotiated
rather than quoted prices.  The latest quarterly update forms the basis for the price, but a trade requires the seller to register the
change in the claim ownership with the recorder.  The secondary trade does not concern the ACCORDer or the firm.
The deferred  debts  accrue  interest  at specified  ratesW',  and whenever  these  debts  have  been  fully
discharged,  the  court declares  that the  firm  is no longer under  its  aegis and  it is free to operate  unfettered.
If the (reduced)  debts  have not been  fully discharged  by the  end of the  5 years  specified,  the firm  is
liquidated  automatically.  (This  too could  be  by auction  with the  owners  and creditors  free to bid.)
Limiting  the ACCORDer's  or the judge's  discretion,  both before  and after  the  auction,  makes
success  less vulnerable  to any  shortcomings  of the  court.  The judge  only rules  on disputes  of fact,  not
questions  of fairness.  Once  creditors  approve  the  plan and  bid  in the  auction,  only fraud  or egregious
"' Interest accrual does not benefit creditors per se (for the bids compensate for this); but if interest did not accrue,
firms would have an incentive to accumulate cash and only pay just before the 5 year deadline to avoid liquidation.
20misconduct not mundane business decisions (should some asset have been sold?) would come up before
the court.
One likely dispute is if the firm accumulates cash without paying any of the deferred creditors.
While many owners are unlikely to needlessly accumulate a cash horde, some may; but cash is often
needed to operate the business, and perhaps even expand.  Having the judge adjudicate this would
generate endless disputes which would tie the courts and the parties involved into knots.  Instead, the
automatic liquidation protects creditors would have a right to this cash.  Furthermore, creditors may trade
their claims at any time12; so regardless of their position in the queue, creditors could cash in their claims
(albeit at a price different from their reduced claim).
While firms may not distribute cash (except as specified to the head of the creditor queue), they
are free to raise additional funds through asset sales, new equity or borrowings.  These new claims cannot
come ahead of existing claims, and may not be serviced before all the deferred claims outstanding are
fully discharged. Any new equity would be in the same class as the old equity (at the very end of the
queue); but a new loan would be behind all other loans (although ahead of the equity).  Note this
difference from conventional bankruptcy filing (where ne~w  loans come before pre-filing loans); and this
is because the old creditors have already reduced their claims.
Putting new borrowings at the back of the creditor queue would not be detrimental to the
continued operations of the firm or disadvantageous to the new creditor.  Recall that the firm is not
obligated to make any cash payment; so its ability to finance its continued operations is considerably
greater. The firm may also discharge all of its outstanding debts at any time; so if the new lenders or
investors find the restrictions onerous, the firm could use the proceeds to discharge the outstanding debts
to the deferred creditors and operate unfettered by the rules of the ACCORD.
It is not onerous  for the ACCORDer  to calculate  interest  (which  must be near market  rates) and this permits  loans in
foreign  currency  to accrue  interest  at a different  rate.
12 When  they do trade,  they have  to inform  the auditor  so the cheque  could  be sent  to the correct  claimant;  but
neither  the firm nor  the court  need  to be informed.
21Some may think that the ACCORD,  hurts creditors because their debts are reduced without giving
them an equity stake in the firm or curtailing the owners'  control.  In fact, creditors are hurt already
because they have little legal protection (despite laws) and seem unable in most countries to seize control
of the firm if they wanted to (not all creditors seek this).  Offering the ACCORD as an additional
alternative to existing bankruptcy could therefore only benefit creditors whose consent is still needed.
The ACCORD would only be used if changing the current status quo were a positive sum game.  Such a
Pareto improvement could arise from eliminating the transaction costs and other inefficiencies of multi-
party negotiations, with the inevitable but wasteful threats and bluffs, or from increased efficiency when
the corporate debt overhang is eliminated.
Final Comments
The ACCORD differs from other market-based schemes proposed in the literature in that it
specifically does not allow for a change in control or a dilution of ownership.  Rather than ask, as
Bebchuck does in his pioneering proposal, which class of creditors should get the firm, ACCORD assures
the owners that they would continue to own and operate the firm, and instead has creditors bid against
each other by trading off how much they are willing to collect against how long they are willing to wait.
This feature of ACCORD makes it particularly suited to the current East Asian situation where
creditors are ill suited to operate the myriad firms that are staggering under large debts, but where creditor
rights are not enforced in practice.  If the owner-managers are assured of remaining in control, and their
incentive to operate the firm were restored by reducing the face value of the debt claims, creditors would
collectively be better off.  The ACCORD scheme does just this by having them pool their information
about how much debt each firm may be able to service through competing bids and reducing the debts
accordingly.
22References
Aghion,  P., 0. Hart and J. Moore  (1992),  "The Economics  of Bankruptcy  Reform,  " Journal of
Law, Economics  and Organization,  Vol. 8, Number  3 (October),  523-546.
(1995),  "Insolvency  Reform  in the U.K.,  A Revised  Proposal,"  Insolvency  law
& Practice,  Vol.1  1, No.3, pp 67-74.
Bebchuk,  Lucian  Ayre (1988),  "A  New Approach  to Corporate  Reorganizations,"  Harvard  Law
Review,  Vol. 101  (February),  775-804.
Berkovitch,  Elazar  and Ronen Israel  (1999),  "Optimal  Bankruptcy  Laws Across  Different
Economic  Systems,"  Review  of Financial  Studies,  Summer,  12(2),  347-377.
Cramton,  Peter,  "Money  Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide  Narrowband  PCS Auction,"  Journal of
Economics  and Management  Strategy, 1995,  4, 267-343.
Cramton,  Peter, "The  FCC Auctions:  An Early Assessment,"  Journal of Economics  and
Management  Strategy,  1997,  6, 431-495.
Cramton,  P., R. Gibbons  and P. Klemperer  (1987),  "Dissolving  a Partnership  Efficiently,"
Econometrica,  Vol.55,  pp615-632.
Gilson,  S. (1995),  "Transactions  Costs and Capital  Structure  Choice:  Evidence  From Financially
Distressed  Firms,"  working  paper,  Harvard  Business  School.
Hart, Oliver,  Rafael  La Porta Drago,  Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and John Moore  (1997),  "A
New Bankruptcy  Procedure  that Uses Multiple Auctions,"  European  Economic  Review,  April, 41, 461  -
473.
Milgrom,  P. and R. Weber  (1982),  "A Theory  of Auctions  and Competitive  Bidding,"
Econometrica,  September  1982.
Schleifer,  A. and R. Vishny  (1992),  "Liquidation  Value  and Debt Capacity:  A Market
Equilibrium  Approach,"  Journal  of Finance,  Vol.47,  No.4
23APPENDIX I: Proof of ACCORD Equilibrium
The ACCORD equilibrium of Examnple  2 has four cases.  Since the proofs for the four cases are
similar, we treat only case 1.
Suppose creditor 2 bids b2 according to G(A) for L* < L < 100. Bidding b <  b, creditor 1
realizes a certain return of b.  Therefore, creditor I strictly prefers bidding b to any b < b.  For
b E [b, H / 21, creditor l's  expected payoff is:
b~~~~~~~~~
P(b) -- b(1-  G(b)) +-  J (L - b2 )dG(b2) + -bG(b).
2 b2=b  2
The first term deals with the event that creditor 1 bids less than creditor 2, becomes senior creditor, and is
paid b whether the firm value is L or H.  The second and third terms treat the event that creditor bids more
than creditor 2, and so becomes the junior creditor.  In the second term, the value is L so there is only L-
b2 available to creditor 1. In the third term, the value is H, which is sufficient to fully pay the junior
creditor.  Integrating by parts gives:
P(b)=b-  -- bG(b)+-  (L-b)G(b)  +-  JG(b 2 )db2,
2  2  2 b2 =b
which reduces to:
P(b)=L-b  - b2
where the last equality follows since the condition G I  (b, c1) =0  means that  cl  -2,/2b-  L.
Now consider b e [H 12,  b],  in which case creditor I's  expected return is:
l  b  i  [H-b  b
P(b)--b(l-G(b))+-  J  (L-b 2 )dG(b 2)+-i  J  bdG(b 2) +  f (H - b2 )dG(b2 ) .
2 b2=b  2 Lb2=b  b2=H-b  J
This expression differs from P(b) for be [b, H / 2] in the last term.  Here, if creditor 1 is junior and the
value is H, then creditor 1 receives b only if b2 is less than H-b; otherwise, creditor 1 receives H-b2.
Plugging in G(b) gives:
24P(b)=200-H-b+  21  (2H-L-2H-L-2b-  2-)-  b-( 4 _  l-[5oo-3L-4b])
500 -3  13L  - 4b2
b  4C2 - cl  sinL  300 -3L  - db2.
b2=H/2  4  2b2 -100
We first show that P(H/2) = b and then demonstrate that P'(b) = 0  for b > H1/2.
P(H / 2) = 200  -H  - 10c 2 - c  sin-  (I/ 3)-  b - H +  (  - b-L)
=200-  b-  1  -100  -bHH+  (  H-L-  2b-L)  since c2 =el[  =i+  sin  (/3)]
=200-  - 2  - )
2  - 2-
=200-b-H  - 2b-L
- 2
= b  since cl  -2  2b-  L.
We now determine P'(b)  for b E lb, H / 2].
P'(b) =  - c1 /2b -100  +  Cl
J(300  -3L)2 - (500 - 3L - 4b)2 2/21H  1-L - 2b
- c  I  2b -100  __  cl
=  ~~~~~~~+-
J(300 -3L) 2 -(300 - 3L + 200  - 4b) 2 242H-  L  2  -2b
-cl -/2b -100  ____
4(300 - 3L)(100 - 2b) - 4(100 - 2b)2 242H-L-2b
-Cl  C 1 =0 -cl  _+  -l0.
2V400 - 3L - 2b  2  400-  3L -2b
25Thus, P(b) = b for b  E  [b, b3 . P(b) = b for b > b, too, since b = H - b means  that bidding  b > b has the
same  return  as bidding  b =b.
Finally,  this analysis  has assumed  that b < L, which occurs for L > L*.
We have shown  that, for case 1 and against  creditor 2 using G(A),  creditor I cannot  do better  than
to bid on [b, b].  Thus,  G(A) is a best response  for creditor 1, which means  that it is an equilibrium  for
both creditors  to use G(A).
26APPENDIX II: Variation of ACCORD for Publicly Traded Corporation
In this paper, ACCORD supposed that creditors remained creditors, but were ordered according
to their proportionate forgiveness.  Variations on this scheme are possible.  We now consider one
variation that may be appropriate for publicly traded corporations that have already addressed the
separation between owners and managers.  For the purposes of our analysis, we assume that all existing
debt is at one seniority level.13 This scheme differs from ACCORD since, as well as creditors reducing
their claims, some creditors have their debt swapped for equity in the firm.  We also suppose that, instead
of creating a seniority level for every creditor, we can group several creditors into the same new seniority
level. Finally, we deal with the original equity by giving them a fraction X of the new equity.  Initially we
set k.  = 0, which implies that the original equity claims are extinguished.  The model is now described in
more detail.
The  Model
Consider the general symmetric model of Milgrom and Weber (1982), which has the private
values and common value models as special cases.  Suppose that there are n creditors of equal seniority
and equal size.  Suppose creditors j = 1,.. .,n each receives a real-valued signal Xj  about the firm's value.
Suppose also that the firm's value is influenced by a real-valued variable S.  Let the actual value of the
firm to creditor j be Vj = v(Xj,X.j,S),  with each creditor j's  value symmetric in the other creditors' signals.
Let X=(X1,.. .,X,)  be distributed according to the probability density function f(X) and cumulative
distribution function F(X), which are assumed to be symmetric in their arguments.  The model's
symmetry lets us consider the problem from the perspective of any creditor, say creditor 1. Let Ym  be the
mth  lowest order statistic of X2,. . .Xn and define Am(x,y)  / E(VIIXg=x,Ym=y).
The auction identifies those creditors most willing to reduce their debt, and allows them to
continue as creditors, while the remaining creditors (those most optimistic about the firm's prospects)
13  Several  levels  of seniority  can be accommodated  by applying  the original  ACCORD  scheme  to all but the most
junior creditors,  with  this variation  of ACCORD  applying  only  to the most  junior creditors.
27swap  their debt for equity. This outcome  can be accomplished  through  a variety  of auction formats 4.
One  consideration  is whether  creditors,  despite  their identical  initial  debt levels, should  end up with
different  stakes  in the firm, i.e., should  there be a discriminatory  outcome  to a non-discriminatory  process.
A second  issue is whether  to exogenously  specify  how many  would  remain creditors  (or this could  also be
made  endogenous  by making it depend  on the bids submitted). For simplicity,  we choose  to exogenously
specify  that the "m" creditors  with the lowest  bids (i.e. those offering  to forgive  the most) would  remain
creditors  and have  the face  value of their debt  reduced  to the bid of the (m+l)st  lowest  bid. Thus,  all
pessimists'  debts are reduced  by the  same  proportion even if they offered  to accept a greater  reduction:
ensuring  the "voluntary"  nature  of the transaction.
The other  n-m creditors  would each  receive  the same 1/(n-m)  fraction  of the firm's newly  issued
equity  after the old owners  are wiped out as under  conventional  bankruptcy. Thus,  the auction  establishes
a uniform  price for the m "winners"  and another  uniform  price for the (n-m) "losers." The  equilibrium
bidding  strategy  is now described.
Proposition  Al: The  equilibrium  bidding  strategy  for a bidder  with signal  x is:
b* (x)  =  Vm  (a,  a) dL(a  i x)
x  n
where  L(aI x)  exp(-x n(  s) ds.
a  F(s I  s)
Proof:  See Appendix  III.
We illustrate  the equilibrium  bidding  strategy  with an example.
Example Al: Consider  the special  case of the independent  private values  model with values  uniform  on
[0,1]. Then  f(ylx)  = f(y) = 1 on [0,1],  Am(x,y)  = x, and the symmetric  equilibrium  bidding  strategy  is:
b*(x)  =
n+l'
14 It is envisioned  that  the  auction  would  be conducted  through  sealed  bids,  and  not open  outcry  as in an English
auction.  The  now  extensive  literature  on auction  theory  discusses  how  such  details  affect  bidding  strategies;  but
such  details,  though  important,  distract  from  the  main  results  of the  paper.
28which is decreasing in n and independent of m.
The independent private values case in Example Al  is similar to the partnership dissolution
problem of Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1985 hereafter CGK).  Efficient dissolution requires the
partner with the highest value for the firm buying out the other partners.  This occurs in our model with m
= n- 1, although the buyer (sole equity-holder) pays off the others, not with cash as in CGK, but with
senior debt in the firm.  If each creditor's private value is the deterministic amount that they can realize
with the residual rights of control of the firm, then there is no difference between CGK and our model
with m = n- 1. If the private value is stochastic, as is only reasonable, there is a difference because the
debt may not be fully repaid if the realized subsequent value of the firms were low while the equity-
holder obtains the upside gain when the firm's subsequent value is high.
To capture the stochastic nature of the firm's value, the model above is altered to explicitly
incorporate the uncertainty in payoffs, even with the auction process revealing the estimates of the parties.
We also restrict ourselves to the common value model.  (Thus, the value of the firm does not depend on
who becomes the equity-holders.)  Let V be a random variable representing the common value of the
firm.  Let g(A) and G(A) be the probability density and cumulative distribution functions of V.  For
simplicity, suppose that g(AIX,  =xi,...,  Xn  =x)  has strictly positive weight on and only on the interval
[V,  V] for all vectors  (XI  =xl,..., X&=xn).
Corollary Al:  For the common value setting with stochastic firm value, the symmetric equilibrium
bidding strategy, b*(-), solves the following differential equation:
O  mb(x)  g(v  I  x, x)dvf  (x I  x) - b*  (x)[1-  G(mb  (x) I  x, x)1fm  (x I  x) f  -g(),~v~xx-
v=V m
1  x
+  f  J  (v - mb * (x))g(v I  x, x, ym+I  )dvfm,m+l  (x, y+ 1 I  x)dym+
n  - m Y _=X  v=mb*(x)
x  x  v
-m  J  Tmb *'(x)g(v  I  x, Ym y1 m+ )dvfm,m+l  (ym, ym+l  y  x)dym+ldym.
n-m  y=X  Ym+,=X  v=mb*(x)
29Proof: See Appendix III.
Since the properties of this equilibrium bidding strategy are difficult to ascertain in general from
the differential equation above, we consider another example.
ExampleA2:  Let n=3 and xj - U[O,1], with xl, x2, and x 3 independent.  Suppose that
G(v IxI,  x 2, X 3)  =  vX  +X2+X3  for v 0 [O,l].
Therefore, the expected value of V is strictly increasing in xj, j= 1,2,3. We consider two cases: one in
which the reorganization leads to 1 equity-holder and 2 creditors (m=2); and the other in which the
reorganization leads to 2 equity-holders and 1 creditor (m=l).  The equilibrium bidding strategies for
these two cases are determined in Appendix III and illustrated in the figure below.  In Example Al, b*(x)
was independent of m.  In this example, there is a dependence on m, but it is quite small, as is evident
from the figure.
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Keeping owners in control
Many East Asian firms are managed by their controlling (not necessarily majority) shareholders.
Wiping out the owners' stake and making some creditors the firm's new owners may be an appropriate
30allocation of losses, but it does not ensure the efficient operation of the firms.  First, considerable
institutional infrastructure (e.g. cultural norms and contract enforcement) is needed for a clean separation
of ownership and management, and these takes many years to evolve. Second, there are considerable firm
specific skills which the controlling shareholders and managers possess, and these may be lost if existing
shareholders are wiped out.  Third, creditor oversight is far simpler than owner oversight, and current
creditors may lack the expertise to properly oversee the operations of the firm or evaluate the selection
and proper remuneration of managers.
The basic version of the proposed scheme therefore needs to be amended, and there are two
methods that may be used separately or together.  Thefirst  method is to violate absolute priority and
award the managers a fraction 8 of the equity in the firm, perhaps even setting 8 > 2.  This dilution of the
equity makes exchanging one's debt for equity less attractive to creditors, leading them to bid more
aggressively to remain creditors.  Therefore, the more existing owners ' stake is preserved, the lower
would be  face  value of reconstituted debt in equilibrium.
More precisely, following closely proposition Al, the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy for
the general symmetric model when the managers are allocated 8 of the equity is:
b*(x)  =  x  vm(c,a)  d&(oIx)
x  n
where  L(c I  x)  =  exp(-  s  (s  s) ds.
U  X(s  s)
And for the case of the independent private values model with values uniform on [0,1], f(ylx) = f(y)  I
on [0,1], and Am(x,y)  = x, this reduces to:
b*(x)  =-
which is increasing in 8.
31Appendix  III: Proofs  for Appendix  II
Proof of Proposition Al:  To determine the equilibrium of this game, let b*(=) be the symmetric bidding
function and suppose that it is strictly increasing.  Assuming that bidders 2,...,n  use b*(=), we focus on
bidder 1.  Recall that Am(x,y)  / E(VIjXI=x,Ym=y)  and define Am(x,y,z)  I E(ViIX 1=x,Ym=y,Ym+,=z).  With
estimate x and a bid of b*(x ), bidder I's expected profit is:
x
b*(ym)fm  (ym  x)dym
Ym  =x
I  x  x
+  J  f  [VM  (x, Ym, Ym+j)  - mb * (y,)]fm,m+l  (ym  ym+l I  x)dym+ldym
nmYm  =X  Ym+l=YM
n  m  x
+ n  I  I  l  v m(x, y.,)ym+l  )-mb  *( V)]fm,m+,  (y.,>ym+I  l x)dym+l dym
nmYM=X  Ym+1=5x
The first term represents the case in which creditor 1 is among the lowest m bidders, and therefore
remains a creditor with debt repriced at the m+lI" lowest bid, which is the mth lowest bid from the n- I
other bidders, i.e., b*(ym). In the next two terms, creditor 1 becomes an equityholder, and does so without
establishing the debt price in term two and by establishing that price in term three.
Differentiating with respect to v,  setting v =v, and reducing gives b*(v) as the solution to
o  -b*(x)f.(xlx)+  - f [VIxx  J[Vm(x,  yx,Y  ) - mb * (x)]finm+1  (x, ym+  x)dym1
n - nYm+=
- m  X  X~
- b*'(x)  I  Jfm,m+l(ym,  ym+l Ix)dym+l  dym.
n  -m  Ym=x  Ym+.=X
Since
x
X  fm,m+I  (x, Ym+l  x)dym+l =  fm  (xl x),
Ym+l=X
32fm  (x  \  (x) - (n - )!  F(x I  x)ml  (I-  F(x I  X))nmi  f(x  I x),
(m -I)!(n  - m(-1)!
fmm+I (Yimn  Ym+A  Ix) =  (n - 1)!  F(ym  2  x)-l(1-  F(ym+l I  x))y  mf(Ym  IX)f(Ym+i  x),
(m-l1)!(n  - m  - 2)!
and  J  I  fm,m+i  (Ym Ym+l  l X)dym+ldym  =  (n -1)!  F(x I  x)m (I - F(x I  x))y  ml
Ym  =X  Ym+1=X
then the differential equation for b*(x) can be reduced to
x
O  - nb * (x)fl  (x I  x)  +  J  vm  (x, x, Ym+i)fm,m+l  (v, Ym+,  I  x)dy., 4
Ym+i  =X
(n - 1)!  b * (x)F(x  I x)m (I - F(x I  x))
(m - 1)!(n - m -1)!
or
(n-m  -1)  Jvm(x,x,  y)(l - F(y Ix))n 2 f(yI x)dy
O =  b *'(x)  F(x  x)  +  nb * (x)  - y=x
f (xI  x)  -F(x  I x)y-m-l
=  b*'(x)F(  I  )  +  nb*(x)  - E[vm(XI,Ym,Ym+)IXI=  Ym  =x]
f (XI  x)
=  b *'(x)  (  I  )  +  nb * (x)  - v m  (X,  X).
f(xjx)
Following  Milgrom  and  Weber  (1982)  (where  the  only  difference  between  their  differential  equation  for
the  equilibrium  of  the  first-price  auction  for  a single  good  and  our  differential  equation  is the  n  coefficient
to the  b*(x)  term),  we  can  express  the  solution  to this  differential  equation  as:
b*(x)  =  x  v  (ac, a)  dL(c  I  x),
x  n
where  L(a xIx)  =  exp(-J  nf(  js) ds.
,,, F(sjIs)
It follows  from  Milgrom-  and  Weber  that  b*(x)  is  increasing  in x,  as  was  assumed.
33Proof of Corollary Al:  Let b*(_) be the symmetric bidding function, suppose that it is strictly
increasing, and assume that bidders 2,.. .,n use b*(_).  With estimate x and a bid of b*(-),  bidder I's
expected profit is:
X  mb*(ym)  V  X  V
I  J  -g(vlx,y,)dvfm(ym  lx)dym +  f  fb*(ym)g(vIx,ym)dvfm(y.  Ix)dym
Ym=x  v=v  m  y.=R  v=mb*(ym)
I  x  xi  v
+  I  f  f(v-mb*(yYm+))g(v  x,ymiyn+I)dvfm  m+i(ymiym+l lx)dym+ldy,
n-m  Ym  =x  Ym+i=Ym  V=mb*(Ym.1)
+  1  J  f  J  (v - mb * (x))g(v x, Ym, 1 Ym+-  )dvfm m+ (Y  Ym  ,y.  x)dy m+ldym
n-m  Ym=X  'ym+Ix  v=mb*(x)
The first two terrns of this expression cover the case where the creditor remains a creditor.  In the first
tern,  the firmn  value is insufficient to fully repay its debt, in which case the m creditors share the entire
firm value.  The second term treats the case in which the firm can repay its repriced debt.  In the last two
terms of the expression, the creditor becomres  an equityholder, with the m+`st lowest bid from the n-I
other creditors establishing the repricing of debt in terrn three and our creditor I setting that price in tern
four. Differentiating with respect to i,  setting x =x, and reducing gives the indicated differential
equation.
Equilibrium Bidding Strategy for Example A2:
Case 1: m=2
The differential equation for b*(x) is:
0=2x  fvg(vjXI  =x,Y 2 =x)dv-6xb*(x)[  -G(2b*(x)  X1 X,Y 2 =X)]
v=2b*(x)
2b*(x)  x
-x  f  vg(vIXI  = x,Y 2 = x)dv  - 4b*'(x)  (l-  G(2b  (x)  XI  =  Y2  y))ydy,
vAO  y=O
where
34G(vIX 1 =X,Y 2 =y)=  vX+y(vy  -)
y In(v)
The initial  condition  is that b*(O)=O.  The  graph of b*(x)  for m=2 appears  below.
Case 2: m=1
The differential  equation  for b*(x)  is:
1  I
o= J  f  (v - b  *(x))g(v I  X 1 =  x, YI  =  x, Y2 = Y2)dvdy 2
Y 2=X  v=b"*(x)
b*(x)
- 2(1  - x)  J  vg(v  jX  = x, Y 1 = x)dv  - 2(1  - x)b *  (x)[1  - G(b * (x) XI =x, Y =x)]
v=O
x  1
-b*'(x)  f  J(I-G(b*(x)IXI=x,Yl=yl,y 2=y2))dy 2 dyl,
YI=°  Y 2=X
where
-+Y  (  -lYv)
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